ABSTRACT: To date, there is little research on personal crisis experiences of mental health professionals. The aim of this study was to explore some of the reasons for why self-disclosure is so difficult and how these difficulties may prevent productive forms of coproduction. These questions are addressed both from a psychiatrist's autoethnographic account and from the perspective of a peer worker who works in various coproductive relationships. It is shown that mental health professionals often revert to an "I-as-we", speaking of themselves as a collective and thereby reifying the boundaries between 'vulnerable users' and 'invulnerable professionals'. Ethnographic examples are given, of how these boundaries are produced by a continuous, often invisible, and powerful category work. It is discussed how the dichotomous logic of these boundaries can cause people on both sides to feel reduced to a representation of a certain species, which can take on an existential dimension. Ways out are identified for mental health professionals to self-reflexively engage with their own crisis experience in coproductive and other relationships.
BACKGROUND AND AIMS
'People working in psychiatry are all nuts themselves'. That is the first thing people say when I mention that I am a psychiatrist. At the same time, there is very little research on the topic (Peterson 2017) . Most studies are limited to the crisis experiences of medical students (Downs 2014; Gold 2015) . If the discussion ever turns to the crisis experiences of professionals already working in psychiatry, they are often simply regarded as a consequence of this work and not as a pre-existing condition: hence, there are many authors who analyse instances of burnout or other exhaustion diagnoses for mental health professionals (Volpe 2014; Yang 2015) . The causes are simply sought (and found) in their heavy workload, while individual, work-independent vulnerabilities are either disregarded or completely ignored (Peterson 2017) . This study will explore the largely rigid and invisible boundaries between '(ill/vulnerable) users' and '(healthy/stable) professionals', resulting into powerful taboos that may limit mental health professionals' engagement with their own crisis experiences. This is the case despite evidence spanning decades that crisis experiences provide valuable expertise, both in scientific and in practical clinical work (Rose 2015) . The high usefulness of the therapy programme for people diagnosed as borderline personality disorder, D(ialectic) B(ehavioural) T(herapy), for example, is greatly indebted to the experiential expertise of its architect, Marsha Linehan, who only dared speak of her own experiences at an old age. In addition, peer workers have become an integral part of clinical work in many healthcare systems. Further, experiential knowledge is of great benefit in many collaborative research designs (Cargo & Mercer 2008; Rose 2015) , leading to significantly different research questions and results (Gillard et al. 2010) while also giving rise to a different research ethics (Rose et al. 2003) .
Thus, mental health professionals' own crisis experiences can provide significant added value for clinical and scientific work. However, in many of these coproductive relationships, these experiences are only represented by the participating users. Professional researchers generally hold back with a self-reflexive or open engagement with their own crisis experiences (Rose 2009 ). This imbalance raises a number of questions for the field of mental health coproduction: how can a relationship on equal footing develop if one of the participating groups is unwilling to open up? How are users supposed to succeed in coping with their own stigma if we as mental health professionals are unable to do so ourselves? And what ways are available to deal with issues of power and control, which are so important in collaborative relationships, if one side opens up, but the other does not?
Therefore, this study provides for a predominantly reflexive, autoethnographic approach to the issue of powerful boundaries within various mental health coproductive relationships. The aim is to explore some of the reasons for why self-disclosure is so difficult for mental health professionals. Mainly focussing on aspects of (mostly implicit and categorical forms of) power, it attempts to answer the research question on how structural or institutionalized boundaries may prevent fruitful coproductive relationships between mental healthcare professionals and users. This question is addressed both from a psychiatrist's autoethnographic perspective (SvP) and from the perspective of a peer worker (GS) who works in various coproductive relationships (Box 1). The end of this study identifies ways for mental health professionals to self-reflexively engage with their own crisis experience in coproductive and other relationships.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology of autoethnography aims to describe personal experiences (auto) and analyse them (graphy), in order to comprehend larger cultural contexts (ethno) or to make them comprehensible (Ploder & Stadlbauer 2016) . It calls scientific preconceptions into question by positing research as a social and political act. The crisis of representation in the 1980s clearly demonstrated the positionality and perspectivity of all scientific knowledge (Latour 1998) . On this basis, the aim of autoethnography is to treat one's own experiences and perspectives reflexively and personally rather than taking an objective and neutral stance (Ellis 2004) . At the same time, autoethnography does not merely aim to relate, but also to understand: personal experiences and perspectives interface with theory, thus necessitating an analytical reflexivity (Ploder & Stadlbauer 2016) .
In this article, the choice of autoethnography as a methodology results from the background of this study: if psychiatrists usually do not speak of themselves and their own crisis experiences, this article aims to change this: long before my decision to study psychiatry, I was in need of therapeutic support myself. Fundamental for this are trauma experiences with confusing identity uncertainty, mild dissociative states, and a now-resolved tendency to substance misuse and self-harming behaviour. I have been in continual treatment over the past two decades, decreasingly so, but continually nonetheless, making use of different approaches, but not receiving inpatient treatments, a diagnosis or medication therapy.
Formation of this manuscript
The topic of own personal crisis experiences of mental health professionals emerged from several discussions during the last year between me and three (ex) mental health service users, with whom I stand in close coproductive relationships. For the context of this paper, coproduction is defined as a collaborative relationship, within either clinical or scientific fields, between two persons with and without experiential expertise (we will come to this fallacy shortly) that both aim at levelling or, at least, critically addressing power differentials (Rose 2009 ). The core material of this study derived from these forms of relationships, arising either in one-to-one discussions or during an email exchange that I initiated, with aiming to coproduce a joint manuscript on the ideas.
Yet, forcing coproduction may face obstacles. More precisely, two of the involved users resisted to put our ideas into writing, one because she generally has no interest in scientific text production, the other because she did not consider the topic particularly relevant to herself ('find other mental health professionals that deal with the same problems, they are not ours [the users ones]'). Both arguments reveal a lot about (failed) coproductive projects: goals and perspectives may vary extensively to the point that a joint proceeding becomes impossible (Rose 2009 That was dangerous for me, because I only realized it after a while. Indeed, I do have a longing for someone who is strong, stronger than I am. After all, I have a longing for protection for not having to watch out, for being small in the sense of learning new things and understanding that isn't dangerous, for an experience that acknowledges my weakness without drawing on it. I used to yearn for someone to whom I could 'surrender' the horrors I experienced, someone stronger than me, who would take it on, who would redeem me, who would tell me from person to person, you didn't deserve that. But the world actually works much differently. For me, a good therapist doesn't have to speak about his ruptures, or tell me about his problems. It's important for me that I can feel that this person has experienced a lot. He knows ruptures, he knows crises, he doesn't stand apart from all that. And it's precisely from this experience that he understands or asks interested questions. He doesn't despise me because I'm sitting there as a person in need and our relationship is unbalanced. By this definition, the therapist is my contact person. And never the other way around. Nevertheless, this relationship shouldn't be an uneasy balance of power. The therapist has to be approachable for questions. As a recovery companion, I'm also the one who assumes this role. I never tell anyone my story. I never tell anyone anything without a reason. But I sit there as someone who is absolutely perceptible as a person with my own feelings. With ruptures. With the knowledge of my own survival, my strength. But also with the knowledge how much I always have to fight for it, how unstable that is. I don't consider myself better, not above it. I show solidarity. And I try to encourage people to accept their lives, not to fight themselves. Especially to assume responsibility. I am there, I am happy for the people in my care. Sometimes I also suffer with them for the moment (I'm sorry). And I know that there's nothing I can do for the other person. They have to do it themselves. I'm not responsible. It's not because of me that they feel good or bad. I'd like for a mental health professional to have a similar attitude. The great advantage of a professional is that he is really a bit further removed. That he knows the relationships better, has a better view on them than I do. I believe that the longing to be small vis-a-vis a therapist is a crucial difference to the relationship to a recovery companion. But even in a therapeutic relationship I find it helpful to convey that one doesn't have a solution for the other life, that one knows crises first-hand, that it's a part of life, that the world isn't good unless you do something for it yourself, that the world as such isn't good anyway, that the therapist is a person with feelings that I perceive that it's an artificial situation of strong and weak, that it's a mutual role attribution that can be helpful at times. impressively describing how it feels when mental health professionals fail to open up (Box 1). Her arguments matched my autoethnographic insights. Yet, they were articulated from a completely different perspective and thus could not be simply integrated into the main text.
Methodological limitations
This is what we have right now: an autoethnography on coproduction -is that already a paradox? -whose core ideas are less elaborating upon one person's (SvP) own crises experiences, but rather result from coproduced experiences and discussions. The autoethnographic parts of this study will be written in form of a first-person narrative, the 'I' referring to the perspective of a psychiatrist. Further, the only person that coproduced explicitly, next to my autoethnographic insights, did so in a rather compartmentalized way, within a separated box (GS; Box 1); yet, her arguments are elaborated upon within the discussion, the 'we' referring to both my and her perspectives. These contradictions and ambivalences well illustrate the very topic of this study, namely the nature of powerful boundaries within coproductive relationships. Further, they result from methodological questions, particularly on how we may succeed in weaving the experiences of others into an auto(!)-ethnographic account that is primarily selfreferential in nature -an area of conflict for many autoethnographies (Ellis 2004 ), but particularly sensitive in the field of coproduction.
At the same time, this text is meant to be a 'writerly text' (Abma 2002) . Thus, it does not intend to resolve contradictions and ambivalence, but to provide space for reflexivity, allowing the reader to further engage with this issue. Thus, please take this as an invitation to overwrite or build on this text as you see fit. This text is not about establishing a single meaning, about precision or definition. Rather, it aims to provide a tentative beginning intended to help you develop your own perspectives on the issue at hand. The dichotomous comparison of 'us' (healthy professionals) and 'them' (ill users) is considered an analytical reduction. After all, it never represents reality and is, therefore, placed in scare quotes.
Ethical considerations
And last but not least, ethical questions have to be addressed, in particular when employing the method of autoethnography (Ploder & Stadlbauer 2016) : all persons involved, those who have been described in the following situations and those who contributed with their ideas have been asked for consent; a formal approval was not searched for. Further, strategies to ensure anonymity have been used, such as including only as much detail as is necessary to convey the essence of my experiences. And it is important to clarify that the following arguments, even though they may involve ideas from coproductive experiences and discussions, represent only my own and certainly highly subjective perceptions and interpretations.
RESULTS

Part I: "I-as-we"
On the occasion on the birthday of Dorothea Buck, a famous German psychiatric survivor, a book was compiled with articles on the topic of 'psychosis as self-discovery'. I was also asked to explain how I changed through my encounters with the phenomenon of psychosis. That text was incredibly difficult to write. Although I have never personally experienced psychosis, it would have been possible for me to speak of myself and my personal crises. But I was unable to find the right approach. I got stuck in an impersonal style, provided general information, for example the interfaces between the psychotic experience and normal human experience and to which degree it can contribute to the personal development (of other people).
As much as I tried, I was unable to engage in a selfreflexive, authentic discussion. My wife read one of my many drafts and deemed it artificial. A peer researcher whom I consider a friend called the text colonizing because I arrogated the first person to reflect on other people's experiences. We also developed the concept of an I-as-we because I was not speaking about myself as a person (even though I was using the word 'I'), but rather speaking in my role as a psychiatrist, embedded in and secured by a (particular) profession and school of thought.
As academics, we are surely trained to be self-effacing when we write (Greenspan 1996) . Academic writing is supposed to be impersonal and authoritative. It involves logical processes, an intellectual style of analysis. The views, preferences, or even feelings of the author are considered distractions in this context. Too much subjectivity is regarded as unscientific, 'real' findings can only be obtained through an objective, that is distanced perspective and removing one's own self from the equation. (Harrasser et al. 2009 ).
Yet, the phenomenon of "I-as-we" goes well beyond this academic socialization. Clinical practice also demands that 'we professionals' keep our own needs, aspirations, and weaknesses out of our work as much as possible (Combs & Freedman 2002; Ragsdale 1995) . We are systematically trained to maintain a distance and make ourselves available as an 'impersonal machine', in a manner of speaking, to be of the greatest use to the persons in our care, and also to protect ourselves and them (Heyward & Harrison 1996) . Hence, I feel still embarrassed if I ever insert my own crisis experience into clinical and scientific contexts. It often makes me feel self-referential, overreaching, and unprofessional.
Part II: purity and danger or doing categories
The phenomenon of the I-as-we is rooted at an even deeper level: after much effort, I was finally able to insert these four (!) sentences (out of a total of one page) about my own crisis experience:
It was pure luck that nobody assigned a diagnosis to me. There would have been enough reasons for doing so. My life would have developed into a different direction. And for sure, a diagnosis would not have helped me to develop a sense of self.
I consciously use the word 'insert' because these four sentences stand for themselves, as if they were unconnected with the rest of the text. They referred to me as a person and my personal experiences but could not be simply connected to the rest of the text. As if these two lines and the other parts of the text were from completely different worlds.
Even more, I wonder, if the same phenomenon occurred during the production of this autoethnographic text production: how did it come that it starts off with the topic of professionals' own crisis experiences, also articulating some of my experiences on page 5, without managing to further elaborate upon them? Somehow, the mere fact that I was and am in crisis, without providing for more details of my experiences, appeared to me to be sufficient to substantiate the study's main argument, that a separation between me, as professional and them, the users are largely a matter of categorial boundary work. As much as I tried, any more details of my own crises experiences did not seem to fit to any of the following arguments, instead I referred to rather theoretical and abstract accounts.
This irreconcilability between myself as a (also suffering) human being and myself as a professional still surprises me. Apparently, I have difficulties to establish a simultaneity between these parts of myself. I am a matter of either/or. It seems to be simply impossible for me to construct an intermediary form for an entire text or provide a smooth transition from one part to the other. What is the reason for this? What is this seemingly insurmountable boundary?
Boundaries and the drawing of boundaries are always related to power (Douglas 1966 ). In our case, this is related to categorical power relating to drawing boundaries between psychiatrist/person, healthy/ill, experiential expertise/academic expertise, etc. An ideal category is pure, describes homogeneous types, and is clearly defined (Leigh-Star 1995) . It separates the world into a 'here and there', follows a binary logic, and, therefore, has its own separating or homogenizing effects (ibid). But how do categories succeed in parsing the world into (seemingly) irreconcilable spheres? Or to put it differently: how do we internalize categories to a degree that they cause these issues, for example the failed text production described above?
The following is an example of a scientific coproduction on role expectations towards peer workers in psychiatric practices. In collaboration with one of the participating peer researchers, I presented the results of this project during a symposium. In short, we carved out that the roles of peer workers in clinical practices often are highly contradictory, being defined by more liberties, but also by a high degree of dependency in comparison with those of other professionals (Heumann et al. 2018) . After this presentation, something strange happened: the peer researcher, who works as a peer supporter in a ward in addition to her research activities, was exclusively asked about her personal work experiences, while not a single question from the audience addressed her scientific expertise. I, on the other hand, was exclusively called upon in a scientific capacity.
Categories are especially powerful if they appear 'natural' and remain unquestioned (Leigh-Star 1995) . That way, categories frequently work in the 'shadows' and are fundamental for a large part of structural power. And so it took an accordingly long time until the peer researcher and I determined what had actually happened. During the discussion (at the end of the conference), it also took a long time before all the participants became aware of the systemic nature of what had transpired: by limiting the questions to her everyday clinical work, the role of the peer researcher was consigned to that of a practical adviser; her scientific expertise, however, was systematically denied or not recognized in the first place.
This example is intended to show that the I-as-we is not a random product, but is the result of a continuous, often invisible category work. This type of category work uses techniques and strategies of demarcation, purification, marginalization, hierarchization, dissociation, and homogenization (Leigh-Star 1995) to create clearly separate and homogeneous units. In our case, the category work had the goal of separating healthy from ill, academic from experiential knowledge and affected and unaffected positions and to assign them to clearly distinct spheres. Hybrids, ambivalences, intermediate forms, etc. are undesirable, even dangerous in this context because they threaten the status quo, the (apparent) order of the world (Douglas 1966 ).
Part III: being a category
The question remains what this category work does to those affected: how does it feel -as category, as an I-as-we, as a representative of a certain species? GS impressively addresses this in her part of the text (Box 1), which I engage with in greater detail in the discussion. At this point, I would like to describe a situation that has helped me empathize more fully with the peer experts involved in coproductive contexts (i.e. the 'other side'). The following situation did not arise during a coproductive work relationship, but rather during a transdisciplinary research project with researchers from a social science discipline.
For much of this transdisciplinary research project, I did not feel like an equal research partner. The 'social scientists' involved were friendly and open; I felt accepted and appreciated. At the same time, they only involved me in selected situations: for example, they mostly only asked me for help when it came to preparing a research field, or if they needed to connect with other psychiatrists and psychologists or affected people. And when they discussed their research findings with me, then they primarily valued my assessments of their field notes rather than my theoretical and conceptual input.
Sometimes I was even unsure if they even regarded me as a scientific research partner in this project. I felt as if I was the representative of a certain discipline ('psychiatry') who was only included in the collaboration in that role. There was an irreconcilable and almost imperceptible boundary between me ('psychiatry') and the others ('social scientists'). The latter became more apparent towards the end of our common project. Back then, none of the participating 'social scientists' suggested a collaborative publication. Further, they forgot to involve me in the planning of the final workshop.
These lapses were in no way the result of malicious intent. Certain forms of 'professional territorialism' are natural for transdisciplinary projects (Von Peter et al. 2016) . Further, and as is so often the case in research, at the end of the project, time and resources became scarce and things became very chaotic. All issues were easy to clear up -I would gladly work with these researchers again. Thus, my accounts are primarily intended to show that I belonged to a different world in this project: I belonged to a different discipline, was another category, a different species. This species was not considered one with which one copublishes or creates other content together. It was a species that allows access to the field of research and, when it came down to it, contributes experiential knowledge.
More importantly, however, the risk of such a reduction to a species does not just exist in transdisciplinary contexts. It frequently happens in coproductive, scientific, and clinical contexts; that is only why I used this example. This is especially the case when the boundaries between people with and without experiential expertise are relatively rigid or insufficiently reflected (Rose 2009 ). To give an example, I was introduced to a renowned peer researcher with my name and my profession, and she answered: 'Nice to meet you, I'm one of your patients'. In another case, I was relatively consistently ignored by members of a selfhelp group, while the peer researcher in our team was frequently addressed.
In all three cases, in the case of the transdisciplinary project and the other two cases, I felt reduced, and in each case, this reduction had a strong existential dimension. I not only had the feeling that I was representing a certain category, but moreover, that I was this category. I felt to be categorically different from the other, to be a fundamentally different being. This binary logic of the drawing of boundaries reduced me to being a psychiatrist, to an I-as-we. Other aspects of my identity, for example my social science background or my own experiential expertise seemed to vanish behind it, as if they did not exist. I felt robbed of my diversity and, after all, of my humanity.
DISCUSSION
In summary, it is difficult for 'professionals' to speak about their own crisis experiences, or about themselves as human beings. Often they revert to an I-as-we, speak of themselves as a collective and thereby reify the boundaries between 'vulnerable users' and 'invulnerable professionals' (part I). These boundaries are produced by a continuous, often invisible, and powerful category work. They often only become apparent if one of the persons breaks out or wants to break out of a category (part II). The dichotomous logic of these boundaries can also cause people on both sides to feel reduced to a representation of a certain species, which can take on an existential dimension (part III).
This also becomes apparent in GS's text (Box 1), in which she reports on the experienced relationships in a clinical context and during her work as a peer worker. Her text speaks for itself. It also clearly demonstrates the existential dimension of drawing strict boundaries between 'vulnerable users' and 'stable professionals'. If professionals do not open up, then the people in their care feel let down, used, demeaned, othered, and shamed. They also develop into an essentialized category, to 'a patient', deprived of other (and healthy) aspects of their identities to the extent that they do not exist anymore as full-fledged human beings. The question arises whether this type of relationship can be fertile -can it go further and become (co) productive? Miranda Fricker's concept of 'epistemic injustice' is relevant in this context (Fricker 2007) : by assignment to a certain group or category (the 'poor', 'uneducated', 'mentally ill', 'psychiatrists (instead of ethnologists)'), the person speaking is denied the competence of knowing. They are not treated as a reliable source of information, for example because it is assumed that they are too crazy, too irrational, or too uneducated to really know. This assumption not only calls that person's knowledge into question, but also their status as a human being, as a thinking, contributing and involved subject. Epistemic injustice is, therefore, a form of epistemic power that can fundamentally disrupt and also itself produce or reproduce irreconcilable boundaries even in coproductive relationships.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE
To conclude, the question arises what we can do in to counter this continually reproduced drawing of boundaries between 'vulnerable users' and 'stable professionals', which are often imperceptibly interwoven into everyday infrastructures. Substantial answers to this question can be found in Box 1: professionals do not have to speak out their crisis experiences to be tangible, but should be reflexive about them. Staying in contact with their own ruptures almost automatically results into being naturally interested in the solutions their vis-a-vis found for his or her struggles. This cooperative, coproductive, solidary search for ways out begins with me, not the other. It does not claim responsibility for another person's life; it does not know better for him or her.
In the following, GS's insights will be woven into some theoretical approaches, mostly dealing with the nature of a healing (therapeutic or better human) contact. Thereby, we want to further elaborate upon a certain attitude, a self-understanding or self-feeling that can facilitate working with and for users within coproductive relationships. Our ideas may be helpful for nurses in their daily work. They may also apply to other professionals -to make them think over their clinical or scientific relationships and help them adopting a certain stance towards/within them:
Transdifference
As GS shows (Box 1), it can be helpful during coproduction to make sure that we do not (just) participate in our roles, but most importantly as human beings. A deliberate focus on transdifference seems to be important, that is on the diversity of the (changing) allegiances of each person (Benkel 2007) . It can be useful not to view coproduction as a cooperation of representatives of clearly defined and homogeneous classes, but of individual persons, against the background of their specific, mostly personal, but also institutional conditions. Roles should be treated as situational and not unequivocal or unchangeable. A transdifferenceoriented coproduction, therefore, stands in opposition to essentialist and binary role assignments. This adequately accounts for the complexity of life, with all its ruptures and crises (Box 1).
Reflexivity
The awareness of one's own crisis experiences requires reflexivity. Which discrimination experiences have I had? How did I deal with them? How do I relate to my own crises, limits, norms, needs, demands, etc.? How do I bear these experiences within me? Such a continuous back-reference to oneself can help develop a compassionate, equal relationship (Box 1). Coproduction, therefore, starts with oneself. It is about myself and the questions and struggles, I had and still have in my own life. If this back-reference is missing, people often start speaking or acting in roles, and then coproduction may not be achieved.
A proactive approach to stigma
This reflexivity could also relate to dealing with stigma: how are users to find a way to deal with their crises if the professionals act as if their own crises either do not exist or never even existed? How should they cope with the 'second illness', the stigma of psychological crises if the professionals distance themselves from their own vulnerability and/or assign them to those in their care through rigid drawings of boundaries. As indicated by GS, users may have a desire to learn, to experience from professionals (as persons), so they should be aware of their own stereotypes and defences. Thus, a stigma-conscious and stigma-avoiding coproduction does not assign crises to the other, but tries to keep them alive as an integrative part of the current relationship (cf. Box 1).
In many contexts of life, persons occupying ambivalent roles are regarded as dangerous (Douglas 1966) . For example, and in relation to the field of mental health, peer workers who are simultaneously formally educated as for instance psychologists may frequently be called upon by some of their colleagues to decide for only one of both roles (Heumann et al. 2018) . These are delimitation rituals and rites of passage that are used to maintain or restore order (Douglas 1966) : roles ought to be and, if not, are (powerfully) made to be clearly bounded, unambiguous, and univocal to provide for safety and security -people, then, can orientate themselves and know what they are dealing with.
Yet, the restriction to one role, to an I-as-we, to an 'I as a category', does not create more security, as is generally believed in psychiatric knowledge production or practice (Greenspan 1996; Ragsdale 1995) . On the contrary, it often causes insecurity between me and my counterpart. As both sides do not know from where the other person speaks and acts. Instead, to expose oneself as a human being, also by recourse to one's own vulnerabilities, can contribute to protecting oneself and others and help maintain coproductive relationships. And, thus, also the contents that arise from these relationships.
